DISCRIMINATION: AGE-RESORT

TO STATE AGE DISCRIMINATION

REMEDIES NOT PRECONDITION TO MAINTENANCE OF FEDERAL
SUIT UNDER AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF

1967-Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., 584 F.2d

1221 (3d Cir. 1978).
James P. Holliday was employed for almost nineteen years as a
production manager at Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc. (Ketchum),
an advertising agency. 1 Holliday's supervisors at Ketchum requested
that he retire at the age of fifty-seven, but he refused to do So. 2 A
younger person was then allegedly assigned most of his duties. 3 A

I Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., 584 F.2d 1221, 1222 (3d Cir. 1978).
Holliday was hired by Ketchum in April, 1957. Appendix to Brief for Appellant at 3a, Holliday
v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., 584 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978) (Complaint in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania) [hereinafter cited as Complaint].
2 Complaint, supra note 1, at 3a. Ketchum gave Holliday the option of voluntarily
retiring
upon reaching the age of fifty-seven. Id. Ketchum's Employees' Pension Trust Agreement defined "Normal Retirement Date" as "the December 31st nearest (either before or after) the date
upon which a Participant attains age sixty-two." Appendix to Brief for Appellant at 19a, Holliday
v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., 584 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978) (Exhibit "B") [hereinafter
cited as Agreement]. Under the provisions of the pension plan, however, "[w]ithin five years
before his Normal Retirement Date, a Participant and the Corporation may mutually agree that
the Participant may retire before reaching his Normal Retirement Date ....
"' Agreement,
supra, at 33a.
Ketchum contended that Holliday's involuntary retirement was therefore "pursuant to the
early retirement provisions of Ketchum's pension plan." Brief for Appellees at 4-5, Holliday v.
Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., 584 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978). However, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978 specifically stated that "no ... employee benefit
plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual . . .because of the age
of such individual." Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-256, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 623 (West Cum. Supp. 1979)).
Although Holliday was discharged more than two years before the effective date of these
amendments, the Holiday circuit court referred to a House Conference Report which refuted
Ketchum's contention. See Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., 584 F.2d at 1222
n. 5.
That report stated in pertinent part:
that the purpose of the amendment . . . is to make absolutely clear one of the
original purposes of this provision, namely, that the exception does not authorize an
employer to require or permit involuntary retirement of an employee within the
protected age group on account of age.
Plan provisions in effect prior to the date of enactment are not exempt
under section . . . (0(2) by virtue of the fact that they antedate the act or these
amendments.
H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1000, 1001.
3 Complaint, supra note 1, at 4a. Ketchum did not dispute Holliday's contention
that he
was being replaced by a younger person. Arguments based upon the procedural aspects of the
case caused the substantive claim of discrimination to be relegated to a position of secondary
importance. Appendix to Brief for Appellant at 8a, Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove,
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few weeks later, on January 30, 1976, Holliday was " 'involuntarily
retired.' "4 Asserting that Ketchum intentionally engaged in discriminatory conduct based upon age, and that he suffered injury as a
result, 5 Holliday initiated an action under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA). 6
Holliday filed a notice with the United States Department of
Labor 168 days after he was discharged, in which he indicated his intention to sue Ketchum. 7 This action complied with the 180 day limitations period stipulated in the ADEA. 8 Shortly thereafter, Holliday
also instituted an action under state law by filing an age discrimination claim with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC). 9 Since the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act allowed

Inc., 584 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978) (Motion to Dismiss in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania).
' Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., 584 F.2d at 1222.
5 Id, at 1222. The complaint by Holliday alleged:
16. Pursuant to a course of discriminatory conduct, Ketchum by its officers and
agents intentionally and deliberately denied to plaintiff and other aging employees
equal employment opportunities, specifically, the right to continued employment on
the basis of performance and ability, rather than on the basis of age.
The complaint then enumerated the specific damages alleged, including deprivation of steady
employment, income, and fringe benefits. The alleged injury also consisted of "humiliation and
embarrassment." Complaint, supra note 1, at 4a-5a.
6 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976) as amended by Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Amendments of 1978, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634. (West Cum. Supp. 1979); see notes 24-31 infra
and accompanying text.
7 584 F.2d at 1222. Notice of intent to sue was filed on July 15, 1976. Complaint, supra
note 1, at 5a. Filing a notice of intent to sue is a procedural requirement under the ADEA. The
statute provided, in pertinent part:
No civil action may be commenced by an individual under this section until the
individual has given the Secretary not less than sixty days' notice of an intent to file
such action. Such notice shall be filed(1) within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful
practice occurred, or
(2) in a case to which section 14(b) [633(b)] of this title applies,
within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred
or within thirty days after receipt by the individual of notice of termination of proceedings under State law, whichever is earlier.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 7(d), 81 Stat. 605 (1967)
(prior to 1978 amendment). Subsequent to Holliday's notice of intent to sue, the ADEA was
amended to read "[n]o civil action may be commenced ... until 60 days after a charge alleging
unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Secretary." 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d) (West Cum.
Supp. 1979).
a The'ADEA mandated that notice of intention to sue be filed within 180 days after the
date of the alleged unlawful practice. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d).
9 584 F.2d at 1223. Holliday filed an age discrimination claim with the PHRC on August 5,
1976, three weeks after notice of intent to sue was filed at the federal level. Id. The PHRC was
established by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA). PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 956
(Purdon 1964) (current version at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 956 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-
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only 90 days in which to file with the PHRC, 10 and Holliday filed
189 days after the alleged discriminatory act, 11 the Commission rejected Holliday's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. 12
Pursuant to the notice of suit he had given the United States
Department of Labor, Holliday filed an action under the ADEA in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on February 10, 1977.13 The court disposed of Holliday's
claim in a brief memorandum opinion. 14 The focus of the court's
decision was section 633(b) of the ADEA, 15 which read in pertinent
part:
In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State
which has a law prohibiting discrimination in employment because
of age and establishing or authorizing a State authority to grant or
seek relief from such discriminatory practice, no suit may be
brought under section 626 of this title before the expiration of sixty
days after proceedings have been commenced under the State law,
unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated. 16
The court noted that section 633(b) was applicable, since the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act prohibited discrimination on the
basis of age, and the PHRC was empowered to seek relief in such

1979)). The PHRC was granted the power and the duty "[tio initiate, receive, investigate and
pass upon complaints charging unlawful discriminatory practices." Id. § 957(0. The discharge of
an employee, based upon age, was among the discriminatory practices proscribed by the PHRA.
td. § 955(a).
The procedure under the PHRA requires the individual claiming to be aggrieved by an
alleged unlawful discriminatory practice to file a verified complaint setting forth the specific
disputed acts. If there is a reason to believe that unlawful discrimination has occurred the
PHRC is authorized to investigate. If the investigation reveals the existence of probable cause to
believe that discriminatory practices have occurred, the PHRC is obligated to halt the unlawful
activity "by conference, conciliation and persuasion." Id. § 959. A hearing before the PHRC
may be conducted if these methods are ineffective, and an order to cease discriminatory practices may be issued. Id.
10 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). The provision states that

"[any complaint filed pursuant to this section must be so filed within ninety days after the
alleged act of discrimination." Id.
11 Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., 584 F.2d at 1223; see notes 9-10 supra.
12 Appendix to Brief for Appellant at 78a, Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc.,
584 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978). Plaintiff's case was closed by the PHRC on September 30, 1976.
Id.
53 Appendix to Brief for Appellant at la, Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., 584
F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Docket Entries].
14 Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., No. 77-140 (W.D. Pa., May 6, 1977).
1 29 U.S.C. § 633(b), quoted in Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., No. 77140, slip op. at I (W.D. Pa. May 6, 1977).
56 29 U.S.C. § 633(b).
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cases. 17 Holliday's claim was absent equitable considerations that
might have excused his late filing with the PHRC. 1I Thus, the court
found that Holliday's failure to timely file with the PHRC did not
meet the procedural requirements of the ADEA, and the court was
deprived of federal subject matter jurisdiction. 19 Ketchum's motion
to dismiss was granted. 20
Holliday appealed from the judgment of the district court. 21 In
Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, en banc, reversed and remanded, 22 holding
that "resort to state age discrimination remedies is not a precondition
23
to maintaining a federal suit for age discrimination."
The purpose of the ADEA, as stated by Congress, was to foster
the employment of older workers based upon their ability rather than
upon their age, and to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment. 24 While the Secretary of Labor was granted the plenary power to administer, investigate, and enforce the provisions of
the ADEA, 25 a person aggrieved under the terms of the Act was also
given the right to bring a private civil suit. 26 Actions alleging non-

11Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., No. 77-140, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Pa. May
6, 1977); see note 9 supra.
58 Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., No. 77-140, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Pa. May
6, 1977). The district court distinguished Goger v. H.K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974),
in which detrimental reliance upon representations by federal and state officials had been held
to excuse late filing. Id. at 16-17; see note 43 infra and accompanying text.
'9 Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., No. 77-140, slip op. at 2-3 (W.D. Pa.
May 6, 1977), revd and remanded, 584 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978). The court followed Gates v.
Squibb Corp., No. 74-928 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 1975) (Teitelbaum, J.) (failure to timely file with
PHRC is jurisdictional defect absent special considerations). Id.
20 Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., No. 77-140 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 1977)
(order granting defendant's motion to dismiss), revd and remanded, 584 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir.
1978).
21 Docket Entries, supra note 13, at la.
22 584 F.2d at 1222, 1230. On appeal, the case was argued first on February 24, 1978, and
was reargued on May 11, 1978. Id. at 1222.
23 Id. at 1222.
24 29 U.S.C. § 621. An additional purpose of the Act was to assist employers and workers in
dealing with those problems arising from the effect of age upon employment. Id.; see H.R. REP.
No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS 2213, 2214.
Specific practices by employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations which were
deemed contradictory to the purpose of the Act, and hence unlawful, were detailed in another
section of the Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), (b), (c).
25 29 U.S.C. §§ 625, 626. "The investigation and enforcement provisions of the bill essentially follow those of the Fair Labor Standards Act.'" H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2213, 2218; see notes 90 & 113-18 infra
and accompanying text.
26 29 U.S.C. § 626(c). "'Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction ..... Id.
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compliance with substantive provisions of the ADEA 2 7 were governed by specific procedural requirements. 28 Two of the procedural
sections of the Act have been the subject of controversy because they
contain ambiguous language. 29 Only one of these sections, 633(b),
concerning the federal-state relationship, was at issue in Holliday. 30
The literal language of that section did not clarify whether filing an
age discrimination complaint with the appropriate state agency was
intended to be a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, or subject to
waiver when a federal suit was initiated. 31

27 The ADEA originally protected only persons between the ages of 40 and 65. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 12, 81 Stat. 607 (1967) (prior to
1978 amendment). The 1978 amendments extended the coverage of the Act to age 70. 29
U.S.C.A. § 6 31(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
28 The sections of the ADEA which are relevant to private civil suit under the Act are 29
U.S.C. §§ 62 6(c), (d), 633(b), 633a(c), (d). Section 633a relates only to employment with the
federal government. 29 U.S.C. § 633a.
29 See generally Note, Procedural Prerequisites to Private Suit Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 457, 457-59 (1977); Note, The Procedural
Requirements of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 9 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 540,
543-44, 550-51 (1978). These two sections, 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(d) & 633(b), both stipulate time
limitations or requirements. Section 633(b) is quoted in part in the text accompanying note 16
supra, and section 626(d) is quoted in part in note 7 supra. Within the context of a single
ADEA case, courts frequently discuss both of these sections. E.g., Eklund v. Lubrizol Corp.,
529 F,2d 247, 248 (6th Cir. 1976); Rucker v. Great Scott Supermarkets Corp., 528 F.2d 393,
394-95 (6th Cir. 1976); Cowlishaw v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 425 F. Supp. 802, 803-04
(E.D.N.Y. 1977); Smith v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 419 F. Supp. 770, 774-75 (D.N.J.
1976), revd and remanded, 584 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1978); Sutherland v. SKF Indus., Inc., 419
F. Supp. 610, 614-15 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
30 584 F.2d at 1224. While the holding in Holliday turned upon the court's construction of
section 633(b), the court stated that "[t]he resolution of th[e] issue depends upon the interpretation of two statutory provisions: section 626(d) . . .and section 633 ...." Id. The extent of the
court's discussion of section 626(d) was limited. 584 F.2d at 1227. See note 7 supra. Discerning
the correct meaning of section 626(d) has proved to be quite difficult. See generally Note, supra
note 29, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. at 463.
31 The discussion in Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123, 1125 (N.D.
I11. 1976) illustrates the problems that courts encountered in attempting to analyze section
633(b). The opinion explored the range of constructions accorded section 633(b) by other
courts and the choices thus available in Bertrand: section 633(b) could be held analogous to
certain provisions of Title VII and thereby act as a potential bar to a plaintiff's cause of action;
section 633(b) could be held applicable only in cases where a plaintiff chose to avail himself of
state remedies; or, the court could adopt some position in between. 419 F. Supp. at 1125-26.
In Smith v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 419 F. Supp. 770, 773-74 (D.N.J. 1976), revd and
remanded, 584 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1978), the court's chronological review of the disparate holdings of cases addressing section 633(b) resulted in the determination that this "Federal-State
relationship" provision created no jurisdictional requirement. Smith was heard after the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit had held that state agencies should be given the initial opportunity to act in age discrimination actions. Goger v. H.K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13, 15 (3d Cir.
1974). See notes 39-43 infra and accompanying text. The Smith court distinguished Goger by
limiting that holding to its own facts. 419 F. Supp. at 733. See note 44 infra.
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The cases which have addressed this question reveal diverse judicial interpretations of this section. 32 The first federal case to reach
the precise question at issue was Goger v. H.K. Porter Co. 13 Ms.
Goger claimed that she was dismissed by her employer, a New Jersey
corporation, because of her age. 34 On November 27, 1970, her
counsel gave notice to the Secretary of Labor for the United States
that she intended to file a civil action under the ADEA, 35 but Ms.
Goger did not complain to the appropriate state agency. 36 The district court held that while an aggrieved party need not exhaust state
remedies, the ADEA required that a complaint be made to the appropriate state agency before suit could be brought in federal
court. 37 The court opined that the suggestion that suit under the

32 As of May, 1978, more than 43 reported judicial decisions had sought to interpret the
language of section 633(b). 46 U.S.L.W. 56 (1978). At the time Hollidoy was decided, five
courts of appeals had reached the issue sub judice. Three of these courts held that section
633(b) required deference to state remedies. The other two held that resort to state remedies
was voluntary under section 633(b). See notes 61-66 and 67-69 infra and accompanying text.
The holdings of most district courts were in accord with one of the two positions taken by the
circuits, but some cases adopted unique variations. E.g., Griffin v. First Pennsylvania Bank, 17
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 54 (1977).
3 No. 896-72 (D.N.J., Jan. 23, 1973) reprinted in 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 695 (1973),
vacated and reanded, 492 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974).
" 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 696. H.K. Porter Co. claimed that it fired Ms. Goger "for
good and just cause." However, the company moved for dismissal of the action on the ground
that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Ms. Goger failed to institute state
proceedings. Id.
s5 Id. The service of notice upon the Secretary of Labor complied with section 626(d): The
notice of intent to file a civil action was filed 35 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred
and the action itself was not commenced until after 60 days notice of the intent to file was
given. For the text of section 626(d), see note 7 supra.
36 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 697. "At no time did plaintiff complain of... discrimination
to . . . the New Jersey State Agency responsible for the elimination of unlawful discrimination in
employment based upon age." Id.
37 Id. One of Ms. Goger's contentions was that the New Jersey statute did not make discriminatory discharge illegal. Id. In effect, Ms. Goger was claiming that New Jersey was not a
"deferral state." A "deferral state" is one which conforms to the requirement that the "State ...
ha[ve] a law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing or authorizing a State authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory practice." 29 U.S.C.
§ 633(b). In Goger, Chief Judge Coolahan specifically rejected plaintiff's contention, and stated:
"It is established beyond question that New Jersey is a State which both has a law prohibiting
discrimination in employment because of age and establishes the requisite apparatus whereby
one so aggrieved can seek redress." 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 697. The question of whether a
state meets both of these requirements can sometimes require construction of the state statute.
See Curry v. Continental Airlines, 513 F.2d 691, 693-94 (9th Cir. 1975); notes 49-54 infra and
accompanying text.
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ADEA could be brought directly in federal court "flies in the face of
38
the clear statutory mandate."
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit gave its imprimatur
to the lower court's interpretation of section 633(b). 39 Its approval
was founded upon the results of a brief statutory analysis which compared the ADEA with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.40 The
court held that similar sections in each act were properly subject to
comparison because both acts arose from a common origin and contained similar language. 4a The section of Title VII which the court
compared to section 633(b) of the ADEA had previously been interpreted as mandating initial resort to state remedies. 42
Equitable relief was granted to Ms. Goger "in view of the total
absence, to . . . [the court's] knowledge, of any judicial decision con-

38 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 697. The opinion asserted that the statute was explicit in this

regard: no action could be commenced in the district court prior to the expiration of a 60 day
threshold period in which the state could attempt to resolve the controversy by voluntary compliance. Id.
39 Coger v. H.K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13, 15 (3d Cir. 1974). Judge Hunter stated "[w]e
agree with the district court . . . that . . . the Act . . . does require that the State be given a

threshold period of sixty days in which it may attempt to resolve the controversy." Id. He
rejected Ms. Goger's claim, which had the support of the Secretary of Labor as amicus curiae,
that section 633(b) had no relevance because state proceedings had never been commenced. Id.
40 492 F.2d at 15 n.9 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)(1976)).
41 492 F.2d at 15-16. The court was of the opinion that Congress recognized that Title VII
omitted provisions pertaining to discrimination based upon age. The court suggested that the
ADEA was created to correct this omission. The court assessed the language of the two statutes
and concluded that they were "virtually identical." Id. at 15.
The section of Title VII which the Goger court referred to as "virtually identical" to the
ADEA language read, in pertinent part:
In the case of an' alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State
. . . which has a . . . law prohibiting the unlawful employment practices alleged and
establishing or authorizing a State . . . authority to grant or seek relief from such
practice ... , no charge may be filed . . . by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State . . .
law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976). Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976) with 29 U.S.C. § 633(h)
(1976), quoted in part in text accompanying note 16 supra.
42 492 F.2d at 16. Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522 (1972), was cited by the court as mandating resort to state remedies in Title VII cases. 492 F.2d at 15-16. The Court in Love stated that
"[a] person claiming to be aggrieved by a violaton of Title VII . . . may not maintain a suit for
redress in federal district court until he has first unsuccessfully pursued certain avenues of
potential administrative relief." Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. at 523. In Love, the plaintiff alleged
employment discriminaton based upon race, and filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC orally advised the state agency of the complaint,
and the state agency informed the EEOC that it waived the opportunity to act on the plaintiff's
charge. The Supreme Court held that oral notice to the state agency, coupled with the agency's
refusal to act, fulfilled the procedural requirements of that section of Title VII which the Goger
court analogized to section 633(b) of the ADEA. 404 U.S. at 524-25.
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struing section 633(b) during the period involved," 43 and the case
was remanded for a hearing on the merits."4
In a concurring opinion, Judge Garth approved the ultimate result reached by the majority. 45 However, he disputed the hypothesis
that the similarity of language of Title VII and the ADEA necessitated
that they be subject to the same construction. 46 Judge Garth agreed
with the amicus curiae brief filed by the Secretary of Labor which
stated that the limitation upon the right to file suit under the ADEA
should apply only when proceedings had already been commenced
under state law. 47 Interpreted in that manner, section 633(b) would
operate to provide time for the state to act upon the complaints of
those aggrieved individuals who chose to first proceed at the state
level. 48
4' 492 F.2d at 17. The court cautioned that, in the future, the intent of the Congress that
state agencies be given the first opportunity to act should be strictly enforced. Id.
44 Id. at 17. In the court's concluding paragraph, it specifically noted that its holding did not
"decide on this record whether a plaintiff must always proceed first before the state agencies."
1d.
45 Id. at 17 (Garth, J., concurring).
" Id. Judge Garth believed that if any comparison were proper, it should have been made
between section 2000e-5 of Title VII, see note 41 supra, and section 626(b) of the ADEA which
details the enforcement procedures of the ADEA, and stipulates that "'[t]he provisions of this
chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in
sections 211(b) . . . of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). In effect, according to section 626(b), the
provisions of the ADEA were to be enforced in accordance with procedures set forth in the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976). Judge Garth believed that section
626(b) prescribed the jurisdictional prerequisites for filing suit under the ADEA. 492 F.2d at 17
(Garth, J.,concurring). He stated that the purpose of section 633(b) was to clarify the "Federal
and State relationship," and not to act as a jurisdictional prerequisite. Id. (Garth, J., concurring).
47 492 F.2d at 17-18 (Garth, J., concurring). Judge Garth stated that the Secretary of
Labor's interpretation was persuasive and should have been accorded great weight. Id. at 18
(Garth, J., concurring) (citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1964)). In Udall, Chief Justice
Warren, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that the Supreme Court showed "great deference" to an interpretation of a statute given by the agency charged with its adminstration. 380
U.S. at 16. See Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153-54 (1946)
(construction given statute by agency administering it need only have "reasonable basis in the
law" to be sustained by Court); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944)
("Undoubtedly questions of statutory interpretation, especially when arising in the first instance
in judicial proceedings, are for the courts to resolve, giving appropriate weight to the judgment
of those whose special duty is to administer the questioned statute").
48 492 F.2d at 17-18. Judge Garth stated that it was the putative plaintiff's option whether
to seek relief at the state level. Id. Accord, Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 405 F. Supp.
1353, 1357 (D.P.R. 1975). In Vazquez, the court held that:
So far as the ADEA is concerned, the sole Congressional purpose underlying the
enactment of Section 14 [Section 633] was to give the State time to act on a complaint if the aggrieved chose to proceed there first. To hold otherwise would be to
create a procedural pitfall for unsuspecting individuals.
Id. at 1357.
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Slightly more than a year after the Third Circuit decided Goger,
the Ninth Circuit was presented with the opportunity to construe section 633(b). 49 In Curry v. Continental Airlines, 50 the plaintiff
claimed to have been denied employment as a flight crew member
solely because of his age. 51 The court approved the statutory construction, proffered in Goger, that deference to state remedies was a
requirement of the ADEA. 52 The brevity of the court's discussion
suggests that possible alternative interpretations of section 633(b)
were accorded little consideration. 53 The court held that plaintiff's
claim could be brought directly in federal court only because the
state in which the action had originated did not have an agency authorized to seek relief on behalf of putative plaintiffs. 54
The Second Circuit followed the apparent trend of the other circuits in Reich v. Dow Badische Co., 55 decided in April, 1978. Section 633(b) was once again found to be similar to language in Title
VII, and, consequently, the majority held that " '[d]eference' to state

49 Curry v. Continental Airlines, 513 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1975) (decided March 27, 1975).
The court's determination regarding 633(b) might be considered dicta since it was not essential
to the outcome of the case. Id. at 693.
50 513 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1975).
51 Id. at 692. Curry was forty-one years of age when the alleged discrimination occurred. Id.

Actions under the ADEA can properly be brought for an employer's failure or refusal to hire,
for discharge, or for any other manifestation of discrimination because of an individual's age. 29
U.S.C. § 623 (1976).
52 513 F.2d at 693. In addition to the majority opinion in Goger, the court cited with
approval Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., 382 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Mich. 1974). In Vaughn, the court
noted that the state of Michigan, in which the action was brought, prohibited age discrimination
in employment and had established a state authority to act against such discrimination. Id. at
145. See note 37 supra. Therefore, an employee was required to commence an action under
state law and the proceedings were required to progress for 60 days before a notice could be
filed with the Secretary of Labor in preparation for a federal suit. Deviation from this scheme
was said to bar the plaintiff's suit under the ADEA, 382 F. Supp. at 145. These requirements
could only be waived when a "plaintiff hald] justifiably and detrimentally relied upon official
advice in neglecting to pursue state remedies." Id. at 146.
53 Courts of appeals addressing this question have made at least passing reference to the
split in interpreting section 633(b). See, e.g., Evans v. Oscar Mayer & Co., 580 F.2d 298, 300
(8th Cir. 1978); Garbriele v. Chrysler Corp., 573 F.2d 949, 952 n.7 (6th Cir. 1978); Reich v.
Dow Badische Co., 575 F.2d 363, 367 (2d Cir. 1978).
54 513 F.2d at 693-94. Since the court in Curry drew an analogy between Title VII and the
ADEA, it utilized the standard developed in a Title VII case, General Ins. Co. of America v.
EEOC, 491 F.2d 133, 134-35 (9th Cir. 1974), to evaluate whether the state of California had
created an agency with sufficient enforcement powers to require deferral to that agency before
federal'suit could be initiated. This standard, which was not met in Curry, was "a showing of
such state concern in the specific area of unfair employment practices as to result in the establishment or authorizing of an agency to act in this area." Id. at 135.
55 575 F.2d at 363 (2d Cir. 1978).
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procedures where they exist is fundamental to the ADEA structure."56 The concurring opinion in Reich agreed that the plaintiff
should be denied relief, but recognized the fact that a recent United
States Supreme Court decision had seriously questioned the validity
of comparing the remedies incorporated in the ADEA with those in
Title VII. 57 In the case of Lorillard, A Division of Loew's Theatres,
Inc. v. Pons, 58 the Supreme Court had held that there was a right to
a jury trial in a private action under the ADEA. 59 The Court
examined the statutory language and history of the ADEA and concluded that "rather than adopting the procedures of Title VII for
ADEA actions, Congress rejected that course in favor of incorporating
the Fair Labor Standards Act [FLSA] procedures even while adopting
Title VII's substantive prohibitions." 60 Lorillard had been decided
in February, 1978, but its potential impact upon the construction of
section 633(b) was not yet widely recognized. 61
Three days after the Reich decision, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit decided the case of Gabriele v. Chrysler Corp. 62 The
56 Id. at 369. The majority in Reich seemed to have no difficulty in analyzing section 633(b).
It relied upon language in a congressional report concerning the ADEA, H.R. REP. No. 805,
90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2213, 2215, which
the court believed was supportive of the view that in a "deferral state," the state remedies
provide a "full and adequate system of relief" and there is no reason in such a case for a plaintiff
to be allowed to first present his claim in federal court. 575 F.2d at 370.
57 575 F.2d at 373 (Danaher, J., concurring). Although Judge Danaher stressed the fact that
the ADEA had "incorporated fully the remedies and the procedures of the Federal [sic] Labor
Standards Act," he did not examine section 633(b) in light of this. Id. (Danaher, J., concurring).
Had he done so, it is possible that he would have concluded, as did the court in Holiday, that
the FLSA does not require prior resort to "state administrative machinery." Holliday v.
Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., 584 F.2d at 1227.
A dissenting opinion was filed in Reich by Judge Feinberg. He quoted Judge Garth's concurrence in Goger, as well as the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of section 633(b), both of
which would have applied the federal-state provision only in cases where proceedings had already been initiated under state law. 575 F.2d at 376-77 (Feinberg, J., dissenting). Judge Feinberg based his disapproval of an analogy between Title VII and the ADEA on a comparison of
the legislative history of the two acts. Id. at 377 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
58 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
59 Id. at 585. The holding in Lorillard was subsequently codified by Congress. 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 626(c)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
60 434 U.S. at 584-85. The Supreme Court characterized the ADEA as
something of a hybrid, reflecting, on the one hand, Congress' desire to use an
existing statutory scheme and a bureaucracy with which employers and employees
would be familiar and, on the other hand, its dissatisfaction with some elements of
each of the preexisting schemes.
Id. at 578.
61 Id. at 575. The Reich decision was filed more than a month after Lorillard was decided,
as was Gabriele v. Chrysler Corp., 573 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1978). Evans v. Oscar Mayer & Co.,
580 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1978) was not decided until July 1978, over four months after Lorillard.
62 573 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1978).
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majority in Gabriele "agree[d] with the reasoning of Judge Garth in
Goger .... "63 "that resort to a state agency is completely optional
164 Such a rsl
....-64
result was reached on the basis of a comparison
between Title VII and the ADEA, but without any mention of the
Lorillard decision. 65 The language of section 633(a) was the principal reason why the court perceived a distinction between the construction of section 633(b) and its counterpart under Title VII.6 6 This
was the same line of reasoning that Judge Garth used in his seminal
concurring opinion in Goger: Congress would not have demanded resort to state remedies while, in section 633(a), it provided that a federal action would supersede such state action. 67
Evans v. Oscar Mayer & Co. 68 was first heard in April, 1978,
before a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit. 69 Joseph Evans claimed that he was forced into
an early retirement after having worked for the defendant for
twenty-three years. 70 Evans complied with the notice requirement
of the ADEA, as set forth in section 626(d), 71 but he failed to file
charges with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission. 72 Once again, the
63 Id. at 953.
64 Id. at 952.

65 Id. at 953. The court argued that the limited amount of available legislative history supported its position. Id. at 954. The court quoted a House Report to the effect that section
633(b) "'provides for concurrent Federal and State actions.'" Id. at 953 (emphasis omitted)
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CoNe. &
AD. NEWS 2213, 2218). Read in the context of the entire passage, this language was merely a
paraphrasing of the section, and revealed little, if anything, concerning the legislative intent. The
court in Gabriele recognized this and quoted from the House Report solely to illustrate that the
clear legislative history which existed to support the construction given section 633(b)'s parallel
provision under Title VII was lacking in regard to the ADEA. 573 F.2d at 953.
66 573 F.2d at 953. Section 633(a) provides in full:
Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of any agency of any State
performing like functions with regard to discriminatory employment practices on
account of age except that upon commencement of action under this chapter such
action shall supersede any State action.
29 U.S.C. § 633(a).
67 492 F.2d at 18 (Garth, J., dissenting). In Gabrele, the court reasoned that even under
Chrysler's view of the proper procedural scheme, if the plaintiff initiated state action, then
waited sixty days and began federal action, the state's proceedings would then be completely
cut off. 573 F.2d at 953.
68 No. 77-1692 (Sth Cir. Apr. 5, 1978), withdrawn and replaced, 580 F.2d 298 (8th
Cir. 1978), rev'd and remanded, 99 S. Ct. 2066 (1979). Judge Bright wrote the majority opinion
and Judge Henley dissented.
69 No. 77-1692, slip op. at 1 (8th Cir. Apr. 5, 1978).
70 Id. at 1-2.
71 Id. at 2. Section 626(d) is quoted in part in note 7 supra.
72 No. 77-1692, slip op. at 3 (8th Cir. Apr. 5, 1978). The plaintiff's claim was filed in a
state which indisputably had both a law prohibiting age discrimination in employment and an
agency empowered to seek relief from such discrimination, Id. at 3-4. See note 37 supra.
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narrow question presented to the court was whether the filing of a
claim with a state agency was a prerequisite to a suit under the
ADEA in federal court. 73
Though this question was recognized as "procedural," Lorillard
was not applied and the propriety of a comparison between Title VII
and the ADEA was reaffirmed. 74 However, the court conceded that
"[a] definitive answer . . . [could not] be found in either the language
of the statute, its legislative history, or the policy behind it." 7 5 The
dissent, written by Judge Henley, stated a preference for the view
propounded by Judge Garth in Goger. 76 Evans was reheard by the
same panel and the original opinion was withdrawn three months
after the initial decision. 77 This time, the majority embraced Judge
Garth's opinion and cited the then recently decided Gabriele decision
for additional support. 78 A petition for a rehearing en banc, filed by
the counsel for Evans, was denied. 79 However, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorarito the Evans case in October, 1978.80
The circuit court decisions discussed above, as well as numerous
district court opinions, 81 formed the historical setting for the Holliday

" No. 77-1692, slip op. at 4 (8th Cir. Apr. 5, 1978).
74 Id. at 4-6. The court distinguished between "procedural" and "jurisdictional" requirements, holding that section 633(b) fell into the former category and consequently was open to
equitable modification in cases where it was "necessary to effect the broad remedial purposes of
the statute." Id. at 6. This approach had been used by the Eighth Circuit to interpret Title VII
procedural requirements. Lacy v. Chrysler Corp., 533 F.2d at 353 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 959 (1976); Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976).
'5 No. 77-1692, slip op. at 4 (8th Cir. Apr. 5, 1978). The court recognized and cited the
split in authority among the district courts. The Evans court also cited the opinions of the two
courts of appeals which supported its stance on section 633(b), but did not cite any which held
that deference to an appropriate state agency was optional. Id.
,6 Id. at 7-8 (Henley, J., dissenting). "I think that the individual has the option of proceeding first before the state agency and then in the federal court or of proceeding initially in the
federal court without prior resort to the state agency." Id. at 8 (Henley, J., dissenting). judge
Henley's dissent was brief and pragmatic: he stated that both he and the majority conceded that
the cases were in conflict, and that he preferred Judge Garth's view in contradistinction to the
posture advanced by the majority. Id. (Henley, J., dissenting).
77 580 F.2d at 298. This time the majority opinion was authored by Judge Henley, and the
dissent by Judge Bright. Senior District Judge Smith, sitting by designation, was the swing vote
which altered the court's position.
78 Id. at 300. The second Evans opinion retained the summary of facts presented in the
withdrawn opinion, incorporated Judge Henley's dissent in that opinion, and added a reference
to Gabriele. Gabriele had been filed only two days after the first Evans opinion was decided.
79 Id. at 301. Judge Bright voted for a rehearing. Id.
- 439 U.S. 925 (1978).
81 Illustrative of the multitude of lower federal court opinions is the fact that the Eastern
District of Michigan issued at least eight opinions in this issue by six different judges in a period
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court's analysis of the relationship between state age discrimination
remedies and the maintenance of federal suits. The court recognized
that the issue was identical to the one which it had confronted four
years earlier in Goger v. H.K. Porter Co. 82 The court also acknowledged that because "[t]he proper interpretation of Section 633(b) [required] . . . the harmonization of admittedly mixed statutory signals," 83 the dichotomous positions of the majority and concurrence in
Goger had each gathered support in the period subsequent to that
decision. 84 This split of authority, coupled with an increase in the
number of claimants who failed to comply with the section 633(b)
procedures mandated by Goger, were the announced reasons for resolving section 633(b) in an en banc decision. 85
Writing for the majority, Judge Garth opened his analysis of the
case with a discussion of the impact of Lorillard v. Pons upon
Holliday.8 6 He stated that "[t]he Court explicitly rejected the relevance of Title VII procedures to lawsuits which allege age discrimina-

of four years. Nickel v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 424 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Mich. 1976);
Magalotti v. Ford Motor Co., 418 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Gabriele v. Chrysler Corp.,
416 F. Supp. 666 (E.D. Mich. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 573 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1978);
Bertsch v. Ford Motor Co., 415 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp.,
382 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Graham v. Chrysler Corp., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 876
(1976); McGhee v. Ford Motor Co., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 869 (1976); Rucker v. Great Scott
Supermarkets, Inc., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 473 (1974), affd on other grounds, 528 F.2d 393
(6th Cir. 1976).
82 Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., 584 F.2d at 1222, 1224. The opinion
stated that Goger had held that "initial resort to state remedies was required.'" Id. at 1222. This
conflicted with the interpretation given the Goger holding in Smith v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing
Co., 419 F. Supp. 770, 773 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 584 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1978).
See note 31 supra. If the court of appeals had agreed with the district court in Smith that Goger
should be confined to its facts, it undoubtedly would not have considered it necessary to
explicitly overrule Goger.
83 584 F.2d at 1224.
8 Id. at 1224-25. The opinion cited the cases of Reich and Curry as those which followed
the holding in Goger. Id. Hadfield v. Mitre Corp., 562 F.2d 84 (1st Cir. 1977), was also listed
in this category, although it was explained that the court in Hadfield did not directly confront
the issue of the construction of section 633(b). The primary focus of the Hadfield decision was
the determination of whether Massachusetts is a "deferral state." See note 37 supra. The plaintiff argued for a reading of section 633(b) that would have allowed him to choose either a state
or federal forum for his claim, regardless of the court's decision of the "deferral state" question.
The court refused to reach this issue because it was raised for the first time on appeal. 562 F.2d
at 87-88. Other courts, jurists, commentators, and the Secretary of Labor were cited as supporting the Goger concurrence, affording a plaintiff an initial choice of forum. Holliday v. Ketchum,
MacLeod & Grove, Inc., 584 F.2d at 1224-25.
85 584 F.2d at 1225.
86 Id. "While the narrow holding of Lorillard ... is not relevant at our present determination, we find highly relevant the discussion in LoriUlard which concerns the proper interpretation of the entire ADEA." Id.; see note 60 supra.
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tion." 87 Quoting at length from the holding in Lorillard to support
this conclusion, Judge Garth recounted that the majority opinion in
Goger had been founded upon an analogy between the procedures
incorporated in Title VII and those in the ADEA. 88 The Supreme
Court's repudiation of this comparison in Lorillard required that "the
Goger conclusion that prior state resort is necessary. must also
fall." 8 9 As a result of the impact of Lorillard upon Goger, Judge
Garth stated that he was compelled to initiate a new analysis of section 633(b), with consideration accorded to the relevancy of the
FLSA. 90
The court's inquiry initially focused solely upon the language of
the ADEA. 9 1 Free from the influence of reading the ADEA
in light of Title VII, 9 2 an inspection of the Act revealed no
explicit imposition of the requirement of resort to state remedies as a
precondition to federal suit. 93 Neither was this concept found to
have been implied, 94 though some courts had come to this conclusion

87 Id. (emphasis in original).
18 Id. at 1226. See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra.
19 584 F.2d at 1226. Judge Garth quoted Judge Danaher's opinion in Reich, see note 57
supra, as supportive of the premise that Lorillard undercut the analogies between the procedures of Title VII and the ADEA and replaced them with a comparison between the ADEA and
the FLSA. 584 F.2d at 1226 n.26.
90 584 F.2d at 1226. The court examined Title 29, sections 216 and 217 of the United States
Code (1976), which addressed penalties and injunction proceedings. Id.
91 Id. at 1227. "The language of the ADEA itself strongly supports our conclusion" that
there is no requirement of initial resort to state age discrimination remedies. Id.
92 The Goger court, for example, had compared section 633(b) directly with its "parallel
provision" in the FLSA, section 2000e-5(b), because both sections arose from a "common origin." 492 F.2d at 15. Since the Title VII provision had been "repeatedly interpreted ... as
requiring that appropriate state agencies be given a prior opportunity to consider discrimination
complaints before resorting to the federal courts," the court in Goger had construed section
633(b) in a similar manner and termed the "minor differences" between the two sections "insignificant." Id. at 15-16. Accord, Reich v. Dow Badische Co., 575 F.2d 363, 367 (2d Cir. 1978)
("The Age Discrimination in Employment Act ... [is] not unlike Title VII"); Evans v. Oscar
Mayer & Co., No. 77-1692, slip op. at 6 (8th Cir. Jan. 12, 1978) ("section 633(b) is nearly
identical to . . . Title VII"), withdrawn and replaced, 580 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1978); Currv v.
Continental Airlines, 513 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1975) (quoting language in Goger to the effect
that differences between section 633(b) and section 2000e-5(b) were insignificant); Bertsch v.
Ford Motor Co., 415 F. Supp. 619, 623 (E.D. Mich. 1976) ("To the extent that a particular
provision, such as § 633(b), is derived from Title VII, it may be construed consistently with that
Act,").
93 584 F.2d at 1227.

Id. The court stated that the sole rationale for implying that section 633(b) mandated
resort to state remedies was voided by Lorillard's rejection of the relevance of Title VII to the
ADEA. Id. See note 89 supra.
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upon reading section 633(b) in light of Title VII. 95 The jurisdictional
provision of the ADEA, section 626, would have been the most appropriate place in which to incorporate such a requirement, but none
was included there. 96
Judge Garth delineated three arguments, based upon the language of the ADEA, which militated against required resort to state
remedies. 97 First, section 633(b) "provide[d] that a federal action
filed over sixty days after commencement of the state action must
supersede the pending state proceeding." 9 8 He suggested that it
would have been unreasonable to import to Congress the intent to
mandate state remedies which would not necessarily be concluded
and would definitely be superseded if federal proceedings were instituted. 99 Second, although the relevancy of Title VII procedures to
the ADEA had been disavowed in Lorillard, Judge Garth quoted
from Gabriele v. Chrysler Corp. to reemphasize the differences in
language between section 633(b) and section 2000e-5 of Title VII. 100
Third, the court found significant the fact that section 633 was entitled "Federal-State Relationship," not "Procedural Prerequisites" or

95 584 F.2d at 1227 n.29. The Holliday
requirements to section 633(b) had always
although the legislative history of Title VII
such background existed for section 633(b).

court stated that the practice of applying Title VII
been suspect. Id. This was due to the fact that
very clearly required resort to state remedies, no
Id. (quoting Gabriele v. Chrysler Corp., 573 F.2d

949, 953 (6th Cir. 1978)).
9' 584 F.2d at 1227; see note 7 supra.
97 584 F.2d at 1227.
98 Id. (emphasis in original).
99 Id. This point was very similar to an often quoted passage in Judge Garth's concurrence
in Goger:
I do not believe that it was the intent of Congress to require, prior to the
institution of a Federal action, the commencement of a State proceeding which,
under § 633(b), need not be concluded and which in any event would be superseded by the filing of the Federal action under § 633(a).
492 F.2d at 18; see, e.g., Vazquez v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 (D.P.R.
1975). Contra, Bertsch v. Ford Motor Co., 415 F. Supp. 619, 623 (E.D. Mich. 1976) ("the fact
that the state proceedings need not be concluded . . . and may be stayed does not detract from
the mandatory requirement that they be commenced").
500 584 F.2d at 1227. The passage in Gabriele presents the distinction between section
2000e-5(c), which prohibits the initiation of any federal action until 60 days after state proceedings have begun, and section 633(b), which merely prevents an aggrieved individual from filing
a complaint in district court until a 60 day waiting period has elapsed. Under section 633, a
plaintiff could file state charges at the same time administrative action by the Department of
Labor was taking place. The ADEA is thus absent a period of exclusive state jurisdiction, a
feature which is present under Title VII. Id. The conclusion has been drawn that the ADEA
exhibits less deference to the state than does Title VII. See Gabriele v. Chrvsler Corp., 573
F.2d 949, 954 (6th Cir. 1978); Note, Procedural Prerequisites,supra note 29, at 478-79 (1977).
Accord, Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 569 F.2d 187, 194 n.8 (3d Cir. 1977).
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"Jurisdiction," and that these latter subjects were specifically detailed
in a separate section of the Act. 101

In addition to this analysis, the court accorded substantial consideration to the view expressed by the Secretary of Labor. 102 The
labor department, charged with administration of the ADEA, had
strongly urged that a choice of forum be made available to litigants
under the ADEA. 103 Scrutiny was also given to congressional committee reports written preparatory to the legislation amending the
ADEA. 104 The 1978 amendments effectuated only minor changes in
section 626 and left section 633 untouched. 105 However, a joint conference report which accompanied the legislation clearly expressed a
preference for interpreting section 633(b) as Judge Garth had done in
his Goger concurrence. 106 Although the report was clearly in accord
with the court's position, the opinion recognized that the impact of a
joint committee report filed in 1978 could not be said to be represen-

101584 F.2d at 1228. The court noted that procedural prerequisites and jurisdiction were
treated in section 626(d). See note 7 supra.
102 584 F.2d at 1228; see note 47 supra.
10'
Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 14-15, 19. The agency concluded
that "[s]ection [633(b)] . . . should be read to apply only if the aggrieved individual chooses to
timelv resort to the state prior to bringing an ADEA suit in federal court." Id. at 19 (emphasis
in original).
104 S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 504 [hereinafter cited as 1977 Senate Report], cited in Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod &
Grove, Inc., 584 F.2d at 1228-29.
102 See note 7 supra. See generally Note, Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments
of 1978: A Questionable Expansion, 27 CATH.U.L.REV. 767, 773-77 (1978).
'0' JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 528
[hereinafter cited as 1978 Conference Report]. The 1978 Conference Report adopted the discussion of section 633(b) that was contained in the 1977 Senate Report, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, supra note 104, at 508-10. According to one writer, the 1978 Conference Report "expressly adopted a non-jurisdictional interpretation ....
[A]n individual is free to proceed in
court under state or federal law; the section [633(b)] . . . sixty-day waiting period applies only if
the individual proceeds initially under state law and files a concurrent suit in federal court."
Note, supra note 105, at 776.
The court quoted the report to the effect that: "'It is the committee's view that an individual who has been discriminated against because of age is free to proceed either under state
law or under federal law."' 584 F.2d at 1229 (quoting 1978 Conference Report, supra, at 528).
"'The provision does not require that the individual go to the State first in every instance.
Several courts have properly recognized this distinction.'" 584 F.2d at 1228 (quoting 1977 Senate Report, supra note 104, at 504). In addition to approving the view taken by Judge Garth in
his concurrence in Goger, the 1978 Conference Report also cited the following cases as among
those which conformed to their notion of proper interpretation: Smith v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing
Co., 419 F. Supp. 770 (D.N.J. 1976); see note 31 supra; Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,
419 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. III. 1976); Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1353
(D.P.R. 1975).
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tative of the 1967 Congress.1 0 7 However, a fortiori, Judge Garth was
willing to accord "consideration and weight" to the congressional
commentary accompanying the 1978 amendments. 108
In the final stage of its analysis, the court considered whether a
demand for resort to state remedies would meet the purposes of the
ADEA. 10 9 The court reiterated two major reasons proffered by
other courts for requiring resort to state remedies: relief for the congested federal courts, and the relatively short delay to which plaintiffs
initiating age discrimination actions would be subjected. 110 Judge
Garth did not rebut these bases. "I Nonetheless, the court refused
to uphold what it considered to be a nonessential procedural barrier
since it characterized the ADEA as "remedial legislation .. .entitled
to be liberally construed." 112
Although the court in Holliday intimated that a comparison of
the ADEA with the FLSA was critical to its analysis, the court made

107 584 F.2d at 1229, 1229 n.35. "We recognize, as did the Supreme Court, that ...
the
views of a subsequent Congress 'provide no controlling basis' for inferring original congressional
intent, "[n]onetheless, it is pertinent to note [the views of a subsequent congressional committee] . .. reporting .. . on certain proposed amendments to the Act."' Id. at 1229 (quoting
Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 87-88 n.4 (1968)). Cf. United States v. Price, 361 U.S.
304, 313 (1960) ("the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the
intent of an earlier one") ("Inferences from legislative history cannot rest on so slender a reed")
(Harlan, J.); Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 593 (1958) ("At most, the .. .amendment is merely an expression of how the .. .Congress interpreted a statute passed by another
Congress . . . . Under these circumstances such interpretation has very little, if any, significance.") (Black, J.).
108 584 F.2d at 1229. "A fortiori the views of a joint congressional committee are entitled to
consideration and weight in our re-examination of the contours of section 626(d) and 633(b) of
the ADEA." Id.
109584 F.2d at 1229. The court did not discuss the purposes of the ADEA, but generally
discussed the nature of the Act. See text accompanying note 112 infra. For a discussion of the
purposes of the ADEA, as they were perceived by Congress, see note 24 supra and accompanying text.
110See Evans v. Oscar Mayer & Co., No. 77-1692 slip op. at 5 (8th Cir. Apr. 5, 1978)
(claimant can escape delay inherent in federal court action and chances of conciliation are increased), withdrawn and replaced, 580 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1978); Reich v. Dow Badische, 575
F.2d 363, 370 (2d Cir. 1978) (there is no reason to turn to federal remedies when state provides
adequate system of relief); Hadfield v. Mitre Corp., 562 F.2d 84, 87 (1st Cir. 1977) (section
633(b)'s deferral requirement is grounded upon decision by Congress that courts should be
spared burden of unnecessary litigation); Burgett v. Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan.
1973), quoted in Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., 382 F. Supp. 143, 147 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (requirement of deferral facilitates avoidance of unnecessary litigation).
11 584 F.2d at 1229. Judge Garth was even willing to "recogniz[el these arguments as well as
the other advantages which may be attributed to a prior resort procedure." Id.
12 Id. This interpretation of the ADEA was consistent with construction propounded by
several other courts. In Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 525 F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1975), the court
stated that:
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only passing reference to the procedural parts of the latter Act. 113
The opinion noted that "the FLSA does not require . . . that prior
resort to state administrative machinery is necessary to enforce its
provisions." 114 Judge Garth further interpreted the FLSA as prescribing that a complainant be afforded a choice of forum in an action
seeking to enforce the provisions of the statute. 115 While the court
did not quote from the language of the FLSA to support this interpretation of the Act, it did cite to two sections that it believed
were the basis of such a view. 116

The Age Discrimination [in Employment] Act is remedial and humanitarian
legislation. It is to be construed liberally to achieve its purpose of protecting older
employees from discrimination . . . . A procedural requirement of the Act . . .

should not be interpreted to deny an employee a claim for relief unless to do so
would clearly further some substantial goal of the Act.
Id. at 93-94. A subsequent district court opinion echoed the view of the Moses court and added
the caution that "[flor this court to refuse to hear plaintiff's case due to his failure to timely
notif , the . . . [state] authorities would not achieve the Congressional purpose of fostering state
enforcement; it would simply deny plaintiff any remedy at all." Skoglund v. Singer Co., 403 F.
Supp. 797, 802 (D.N.H. 1975).
Even those courts which compared section 633(b) to Title VII provisions were inclined to
accord a plaintiff the benefit of a liberal construction of the statute. Woodford v. Kinney Shoe
Corp., 369 F. Supp. 911, 914 (N.D. Ga. 1973) ("The Age Discrimination Act is remedial and
humanitarian in its nature as is Title VII"). This was due to the fact that many courts which
construed solely the procedures of Title VII avoided overly technical interpretations which
would have resulted in barring plaintiffs' actions. In Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d
177 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court explained its liberal construction of section 633(b)'s counterpart
in Title VII:
We do not believe that the procedures of Title VII were intended to serve as a
sturpbling block to the accomplishment of the statutory objective. To expect a complainant . . . to foresee and handle intricate procedural problems . . . would place a

burden on the complainant which Congress neither anticipated nor intended.
Id. at 183. Accord, EEOC v. Wah Chang Albany Corp., 499 F.2d 187, 189 (9th Cir. 1974)
("[Title VII] provisions are not to be interpreted too literally or too technically").
113 584 F.2d at 1226; see note 90 supra.
"4

115

584 F.2d at 1227.
Id.; see note 116 infra.

116 584 F.2d at 1227. The two sections that the court cited were 29 U.S.C.A. § 216 (West
1965 & Cum. Supp. 1979) and 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1976). The only provision in those sections
which is analogous in any manner to the procedures contained in sections 626 or 633 of the
ADEA reads as follows:
An action to recover the liability prescribed in either of the preceding sentences
[which stipulate certain provisions of the FLSA and the types of relief which may
be awarded for violations thereof] may be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any
one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other
employees similarly situated ....
The right provided by this subsection to bring an
action by or on behalf of any employee, and the right of any employee to become a
party plaintiff to any such action, shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by
the Secretary of Labor in an action under Section 217 of this title ....
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Although section 216(b) of the FLSA does state that an action
"may be maintained against any employer ... in any Federal or
State court of competent jurisdiction," 117 there remains a crucial
problem with the court's comparison of the two acts. In Lorillard, the
Court stated that the "selectivity that Congress exhibited in incorporating provisions and in modifying certain FLSA practices strongly
suggests that but for those changes Congress expressly made, it intended to incorporate fully the remedies and procedures of the FLSA
[into the ADEA]."118 This analysis by the Court undermined the
Holliday court's presumption that section 216(b) of the FLSA dictated
the manner in which section 633(b) of the ADEA should be interpreted. 119 Lorillard only transposed the jury trial provisions of the
FLSA to an ADEA case because that specific procedural aspect was
not provided for in the ADEA. 120 However, with regard to the
maintenance of a federal suit, it can be argued that the existence of
section 633(b) demonstrates that the Congress "expressly made"

29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). There is no requirement of deference to any
state agency under the FLSA. The provisions merely state that in the event that the Secretary
of Labor acts under section 217 (injunction proceedings), private actions seeking specific types
of relief are precluded. The FLSA is also explicit about where a plaintiff may bring an action; a
choice of forum is provided. id.
117 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). In 1974, the phrase "maintained against
any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court" was substituted for
the phrase "maintained in any court." Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-259 § 6(d)(1), 88 Stat. 61.
1l8 434 U.S. at 582. The Court cited examples of selective incorporation wherein the ADEA
provisions were written to diverge from their counterparts under the FLSA, including the
availability of injunctive relief in suits by private individuals, the circumstances under which
awards of liquidated damages would be given, and the establishment of criminal penalties for
violations of the Acts. Id. at 581-82.
119 584 F.2d at 1226. The Holliday court stated "procedures [for the ADEA] are to be imported from the FLSA, a statute which does not require any, let alone prior, resort to state
proceedings in order to redress FLSA violations, 29 U.S.C. §§ 216, 217." Id.
12o "[T]he ADEA contains no provision expressly granting a right to jury trial." 434 U.S. at
577.
However, we cannot assume, in the face of Congress' extensive knowledge of the
operation of the FLSA, illustrated by its selective incorporation and amendment of
the FLSA provisions for the ADEA, that Congress was unaware that courts had
uniformly afforded jury trials under the FLSA. . ,. We are therefore persuaded
that Congress intended that . . . under the ADEA a trial by jury would be
available.
Id. at 585. The Court was reluctant to incorporate a provision of the FLSA into the ADEA
here, even though there was no mention of the right to a jury trial in the ADEA. The Court
was hesitant to discern "congressional intent where the statute provides no express answer." Id.
This suggests that the Court would have even greater difficulty clarifying an extant section of
the ADEA by reading it in light of the FLSA.
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changes in the language of the FLSA. 121 In a note accompanying his
concurring opinion in Holliday, Judge Hunter indicated that he too
had doubts about that section of the majority's opinion which interpreted Lorillard.122 He believed that the analogy between Title. VII
and the ADEA was not rejected in toto by Lorillard; rather, it remained viable for certain section-to-section comparisons. 123
Regardless of whether the juxtaposition of sections of the FLSA
and the ADEA was appropriate in an examination of section 633(b),
the elimination of the efficacy of that comparison, and the proposition
that it supported, would not be crucial to the totality of the court's
reasoning. 124 The major impact of Lorillard upon Holliday was to
remove the likelihood that the court would become preoccupied with
the comparison between Title VII and the ADEA, and this enabled
the court to shift its focus to a straightforward exegesis of the statutory
language and congressional commentary appertaining thereto. 125

121 See text adcompanying note 118 supra. The Lorillard Court stated that "in enacting the

ADEA, Congress exhibited both a detailed knowledge of the FLSA provisions and their judicial
interpretation and a willingness to depart from those provisions regarded as undesirable or
inappropriate for incorporation." 434 U.S. at 581 (emphasis added).
122 584 F.2d at 1231 n.I. Judge Hunter stated:
The [Holliday] Court's opinion also relies on the recent Supreme Court decision in
Lorillard v. Pons . ..as undercutting the reasoning in Goger. While I agree that
the Supreme Court pointed out the weakness of the analogy between Title VII and
the ADEA in some contexts, I do not believe that Lorillard compels a wholesale
rejection of such reasoning.
Id. Nonetheless, Judge Hunter found Judge Garth's construction of section 633(b) compelling in
light of the 1978 Senate Report accompanying the ADEA amendments, see notes 103-07 supra
and accompanying text, and the court's experience with ADEA litigation. Id. at 1231.
123 584 F.2d at 1231 n1. "Lorillard stands only for the narrow point that the provisions of
the two statutes which affect the right to a jury trial are sufficiently different that they should
not be construed pari passu on that particular question." Id. Judge Hunter pointed out that the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had recently found the analogy between Title VII and
the ADEA to be "quite helpful." Id. (citing Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978)). In Rodriguez, the court found the "Supreme Court's mandate on the exercise of trial court's discretion in granting monetary relief in Title VII suits ...
equally compelling in the context of ADEA actions." Id. at 1238. Many other analogies were
drawn between aspects of Title VII and their counterparts under the ADEA. Id. at 1239. However, it should be noted that Rodriguez was decided before Lorillard's pronouncement regarding the efficacy of such comparisons.
124Judge Garth deliberately presented a line of argument for the contingency that Title VII
procedures were relevant to the ADEA. 584 F.2d at 1227; see note 100 supra and accompanying text.
122 The opinion clearly stated that Lorillard had this impact upon the court. "Lorillard compels us to disavow the Goger majority's reliance on an analogy to Title VII procedure .. .. We
therefore start our inquiry afresh." 584 F.2d at 1226.
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The greater part of the Holliday opinion was devoted to a review
and expansion of the most potent of the arguments which had been
posited by Judge Garth in his concurrence in Goger and by those
courts which had followed his premises. 126 The court apparently
used the intervening Lorillard decision as a convenient excuse to
reexamine an issue which it had decided only a short time before. 127 It is evident that the court recognized a need to explain its
review and reversal of Goger. 128 It stated that "[w]hile it may be
unusual for us to reject a court precedent announced by us but four
years ago, when it becomes apparent that jurisprudential integrity
demands no less, we will not shrink from undertaking that assignment." 129
The effect of the holding in Holliday was to remove a "judicial
impediment to remedial legislation." 130 This resulted in a tangible
benefit to grievants with age discrimination claims in the Third Circuit. No longer was a plaintiff's action, under the ADEA, prevented
from reaching any forum solely because of a failure to pass the procedural obstacle of section 633(b). Complex issues relating to substantive provisions of the ADEA could be litigated because the cases in
which they arose were not subject to involuntary dismissal for failure
of the court to have subject matter jurisdiction.'13

126 Judge Garth's examination of the legislative history accompanying the 1978 Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments constituted the single largest addition that he made to his
concurrence in Goger. New support for his position was also derived from the decision in
Gabriele v. Chrysler Corp. See notes 62-67 supra and accompanying text.
127 As noted before, the greater part of the reasoning in the Holliday decision was not contingent upon the construction of Lorillard for its viability. See note 125 supra.
128 584 F.2d at 1226 n.28. "As Justice' Powell so recently stated, a court must decide "'not to
reject [wisdom] merely because it comes too late.' " Id. (brackets in original). The court noted
that its Internal Operating Procedures permitted an en bane court to overrule a previous panel
decision of the Third Circuit. Id. at 1222 n.3.
129 Id. at 1230.
130 Id. The Holliday court itself characterized as an "impediment" the continued application
of section 633(b) to mandate resort to state remedies. "Unease" with this state of the law was a
contributing factor in the court's decision to overrule Goger. Id.
l31 See Wagner v. Sperry Univac, 458 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Davis v. Boy Scouts of
America, 457 F. Supp. 665 (D.N.J. 1978). See also Spaguolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 19 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 170 (1979).
In Davis, plaintiff brought an age discrimination suit against his employer, the Boy Scouts
of America, a nonprofit corporation. After the court briefly reviewed the history of the interpretation of section 633(b), it found, in light of the holding in Holliday, that Davis had "surmounted the hurdle of the ability and/or necessity of complying with meaningful state deferral."
457 F. Supp. at 670. The court then proceeded to address the question of Davis's compliance
with the notice provisions of the ADEA. Id. The Davis court's discussion of Holliday was not
truly essential to its determination of the issue of deferral. New Jersey's age discrimination
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This generally "liberal" approach developed in the Holliday case
and applied in its progeny was short-lived. In May, 1979, eight
months after Holliday was decided, the Supreme Court of the United
States rendered a conclusive decision in the matter of resort to state
age discrimination remedies under the ADEA. 132 Delivering the
opinion of the Court in Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 133 Justice
Brennan held that section 633(b) "mandates that a grievant not bring
suit in federal court under . .. the ADEA until he has first resorted
to appropriate state administrative proceedings." 134 This determination was unanimously accepted by the members of the Court, although four Justices dissented 135 from Justice Brennan's additional
holding that "the grievant is not required ... to commence the state
proceedings within time limits specified by state law." 136
At the outset of his analysis, Justice Brennan conceded that the
"question of construction of section 633(b) is close." 137 The basis for
his rejection of the approach propounded by the courts of appeals in
Evans and Holliday was a reaffirmation of the propriety of interpreting the ADEA in light of Title VII. 138 Justice Brennan's reasoning

statute provided a remedy for age discrimination carried out by anyone considered to be an
"employer." At the time that Davis was decided, the statutory definition of "employer" did not
encompass nonprofit corporations. Thus, there was technically no state agency empowered to
seek relief for Davis, and no agency to which he could have ever deferred. Id.
Similarly, the plaintiff in Wagner alleged that his employer unlawfully discriminated against
him on the basis of age. When the briefs were filed in Wagner, Holliday had not yet been
decided and the plaintiff's delay in filing a complaint with the PHRC "would have barred him
from asserting any claims based on events that took place more than 180 days prior to ... the
date on which he . . . filed his complaint." 458 F. Supp. at 517. However, the court took note
of Holliday, and found that Wagner's delay "in no way limits the scope of federal claims that he
may assert in this forum." Id. The court was then able to examine other aspects of Wagner's
case, including the issue of the availability of certain types of damages under the ADEA.
132 Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 99 S. Ct. 2066 (1979). The Supreme Court had granted
certiorari in the Evans case in October, 1978. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
133 99 S. Ct. at 2066.
13 Id. at 2070.
135 Id. at 2077 (Stevens, J.,dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined in his dissent by Chief
Justice Burger, and Justices Powell and Rehnquist. See note 152 infra and accompanying text.
136 99 S. Ct. at 2070; see notes 150-51 infra and accompanying text.
137 99 S. Ct. at 2071. For a summary of the facts of the case, see notes 70-72 supra and
accompanying text.
1 99 S. Ct. at 2071. The Court did not even allude to a possible comparison of the ADEA
and the FLSA. The concurring opinion in Reich v. Dow Badische Co., 575 F.2d 363, 373 (2d
Cir. 1978) (Danaher, J., concurring), discussed in notes 57-60 supra and accompanying text,
and the majority in Holliday, 584 F.2d at 1225-26, discussed in notes 86-90 supra and accompanying text, had both interpreted the Supreme Court case of Lorillardv. Pons as undercutting
the viability of comparing the ADEA with Title VII. Both opinions had interpreted Lorillard
as preferring a comparison with the FLSA.
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closely paralleled that of several of the courts of appeals which had
held for mandatory deferral: 139 the ADEA and Title VII shared a
common purpose, 140 the language of section 633(b) was almost in
haec verba with Title VII, 141 and a review of the legislative history
1 42
revealed that the ADEA's language was derived from Title VII.
Therefore, Justice Brennan concluded that it was Congress's intention
that section 633(b) be construed in the same manner as the similar
14 3
provision in Title VII.
The respondent in Oscar Mayer presented several arguments in
support of his position that deference to state remedies was optional
under section 633(b). 144 Justice Brennan dismissed these points,
which were much like those proffered by the courts that held for
"optional deferral."145 First, he noted that the simultaneous filing
provision of the ADEA, as opposed to the sequential filing require-

139 See Reich v. Dow Badische Co.,

575 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1978), discussed in notes 55-61

supra and accompanying text; Curry v. Continental Airlines, 513 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1975),
discussed in notes 49-54 supra and accompanying text; and Goger v. H.K. Porter, 492 F.2d 13
(3d Cir. 1974), discussed in notes 39-48 supra and accompanying text.
140 99 S. Ct. at 2071. The common purpose which Justice Brennan found was "the elimination of discrimination in the workplace." Id. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976) ("it is ... the
purpose of this chapter . . . to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment") with H.R.
REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391,
2401 (detailing background and purpose of Title VII-Equal Employment Opportunity and stating: "The purpose of this title is to eliminate, through the utilization of formal and informal
procedures, discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, or national origin").
In contrast, the purpose of the FLSA was, in part, to correct "labor conditions detrimental
to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and
general well-being of workers." 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1976).
141 99 S. Ct. at 2071; see note 41 supra.
142 99 S. Ct. at 2071.
2
143 Id. Justice Brennan concluded that section 633(b), like section 000e-5(c) of Title VII, was
"intended to screen from the federal courts those discrimination complaints that might be settled to the satisfaction of the grievant in state proceedings." Contra, Gabriele v. Chrysler
Corp., 573 F.2d 949, 953 (6th Cir. 1978) ("there is legislative history suggesting that § 633(b)
should be construed differently than § 2000e-5(c)").
Support for interpreting the scheme of Title VII in such a manner was drawn from remarks
made by Senator Humphrey, discussing changes incorporated into Title VII, which read, in
pertinent part:
We recognized the good sense of permitting the appropriate State agencies
ample time to resolve disagreements . . . through voluntary conciliation and mediation. . . . We sought merely to guarantee that these States . . . will be given every
opportunity to employ their expertise and experience without premature interference by the Federal Govermnent.
110 CONG. REC. 12725 (1964), cited in 99 S. Ct. at 2071.
144 99 S. Ct. at 2071-73.
145Id.; see Evans v. Oscar Mayer & Co., 99 S. Ct. 2066 (1979), discussed in notes 77-78
supra and accompanying text; Gabriele v. Chrysler Corp., discussed in notes 62-67 supra and
accompanying text.
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469

ment of Title VII, was intended to facilitate rapid settlement of cases
and did not indicate that the ADEA gave less deference to state
agencies than did Title VII. 1 4 6 Second, because grievants could
abort state proceedings after sixty days by filing a federal suit, this
did not indicate that such state filing would be futile. 14 7 "Unless
section 633(b) . . . is to be stripped of all meaning, state agencies
must be given at least some opportunity to solve problems of discrimination." 148 Third, the comments of a 1978 committee report
suggesting that resort to state remedies should be optional was not
persuasive. 149
In the final section of his opinion, Justice Brennan construed section 633(b) to require that a grievant commence state proceedings but
not to require that he file within the time limitation set forth under
the applicable state law. 150 A claimant could proceed in federal
court only if his state complaint were dismissed as untimely or after
sixty days had lapsed. 151 The dissent in Oscar Mayer, written by
Justice Stevens, suggested that this last section of the majority opinion answered a question that was not presented for review and the
1 52
Court should merely have dismissed respondent's suit.

Justice Blackmun wrote a concurrence in which he enumerated
the reasons why he preferred an interpretation of section 633(b) simi-

146 99 S. Ct. at 2072. Contra, Reich v. Dow Badische Co., 575 F.2d 363, 377 (2d Cir. 1978)
(Feinberg, J., dissenting) ("the ADEA reflects less deference to state mechanisms than does
Title VII").
147 99 S. Ct. at 2072. Contra, Vasquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1353, 1356
(D.P.R. 1975) ("such a [deferral] requirement would be inconsistent with the congressional concern to eliminate the delays occasioned by administrative proceedings"); see note 99 supra and
accompanying text.
148 99 S. Ct. at 2072. Justice Brennan added: "While 60 days provides a limited
time for the
state agency to act, that was a decision for Congress to make and Congress apparently thought it
sufficient." Id.
149 Id.
The court cited two recent cases for support of the proposition that legislative observations not concurrent with enactment of legislation are inapposite and do not control. United
Airlines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 200 n.7 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1977).
'50 99 S. Ct. at 2073. Justice Brennan's holding did not comport with the arguments of either
Evans or Oscar Mayer. Evans urged that because his tardy filing was a result of incorrect advice

by the Department of Labor, his lateness should be excused. Oscar Mayer urged that since
Iowa's statute of limitations had run, Evans could not remedy his procedural mistake, and the
court was without jurisdiction. Id. However, "[n]either questions of jurisdiction nor excuse arise
unless Congress mandated that resort to state proceedings must be within time limitations
specified bv the State." Id.
151

Id.

Id. at 2077 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "[lun Part III of its opinion, the Court volunteers
some detailed legal advice about the effect of a suggested course of conduct that respondent
may now pursue." Id.
152
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lar to that which was presented in Holliday. 153 However, he concluded that "this is one of those cases that occasionally appears in the
procedural area where it is more important that it be decided . . .
than that it be decided correctly." 154
The position which the Supreme Court approved in Evans is
equally as tenable as that which the court of appeals adopted in
Holliday. Unfortunately, the object of both courts' interpretations was
a section of the ADEA which was so poorly drafted that it defied a
straightforward analysis. The liberal interpretation in Holliday
answered the needs of the remedial, albeit confusing, legislation,
while the Evans decision succeeded only in perfecting a procrustean
scheme which could hardly have fulfilled the intent of any Congress.
It is unfortunate that the enlightened view developed by the Holliday
court will cease to control in ADEA litigation, replaced by a procedure developed for the sole purpose of attempting to keep age discrimination claims from being initiated in federal fora.
Donald R. Kaplan

153 Id. at 2076 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

I regard the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to be a remedial statute that is
to b~e liberally construed ....
In addition, I could be persuaded . .. that ADEA
proceedings have their analogy in Fair Labor Standards Act litigation and not in
Title VII proceedings; that no waiting period is required before a complainant may
resort to a federal remedy . . . ; that it seems so needless to require an untimely
state filing that inevitably, and automatically, is to be rejected; that the legislative
history of the 1978 amendments . . . might well be regarded, because of its positiveness and clarity, as shedding at least some helpful illumination upon persistent
and continuing congressional intent in and since 1967.
Id. at 2076-77.
154

Id. at 2077.

